Stable repeated strategies for information exchange between two autonomous agents

Authors:
Rina Azoulay-Schwartz;Sarit Kraus
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900 Israel;Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900 Israel and Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Malyland, College Park, MD
Venue:
Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2004

Citing 7
Cited 1

Coevolutionary Game-Theoretic Multi-Agent Systems

ISMIS '96 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Foundations of Intelligent Systems
Strategies for Querying Information Agents

CIA '98 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents II, Learning, Mobility and Electronic Commerce for Information Discovery on the Internet
Efficient algorithms for learning to play repeated games against computationally bounded adversaries

FOCS '95 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Believing Others: Pros and Cons

ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Reinforcement learning: a survey

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Adaptive load balancing: a study in multi-agent learning

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Learning models of intelligent agents

AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1

A Distributed Information System Architecture for Collaborative Design

Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Integrated Intelligent Systems for Engineering Design

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

This paper deals with the problem of designing a strategy profile which will enable collaborative interaction between agents. In particular, we consider the problem of information sharing among agents. Providing information in a single interaction as a response to queries is often nonbeneficial. But there are stable strategy profiles that make sharing information beneficial in the long run. This paper presents there types of mechanisms and specifies under which conditions it is beneficial to the agents to answer queries. We analyze a model of repeated encounters in which two agents ask each other queries over time. We present different strategies that enable information exchange, and compare them according to the expected utility for the agents, and the conditions required for the cooperative equilibrium to exist.