Transitive voting

Authors:
Moshe Tennenholtz
Affiliations:
Technion--Israel Institute of Technology, Israel
Venue:
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Year:
2004

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Abstract

In this abstract we briefly discuss some of the ideas of our axiomatic study of transitive voting. In transitive voting, if agent A supports agent B and agent B supports agent C then this will imply some support of A in C. This situation occurs in the Internet, where pages are treated as agents, and pointers among pages are treated as agents' votes. In particular, we will discuss an impossibility result regarding simple transitive voting.