Techniques and tools for analyzing intrusion alerts

• Authors: Peng Ning;Yun Cui;Douglas S. Reeves;Dingbang Xu
• Venue: ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
• Year: 2004

Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) focus on low-level attacks or anomalies, and raise alerts independently, though there may be logical connections between them. In situations where there are intensive attacks, not only will actual alerts be mixed with false alerts, but the amount of alerts will also become unmanageable. As a result, it is difficult for human users or intrusion response systems to understand the alerts and take appropriate actions. This paper presents a sequence of techniques to address this issue. The first technique constructs attack scenarios by correlating alerts on the basis of prerequisites and consequences of attacks. Intuitively, the prerequisite of an attack is the necessary condition for the attack to be successful, while the consequence of an attack is the possible outcome of the attack. Based on the prerequisites and consequences of different types of attacks, the proposed method correlates alerts by (partially) matching the consequences of some prior alerts with the prerequisites of some later ones. Moreover, to handle large collections of alerts, this paper presents a set of interactive analysis utilities aimed at facilitating the investigation of large sets of intrusion alerts. This paper also presents the development of a toolkit named TIAA, which provides system support for interactive intrusion analysis. This paper finally reports the experiments conducted to validate the proposed techniques with the 2000 DARPA intrusion detection scenario-specific datasets, and the data collected at the DEFCON 8 Capture the Flag event.