STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Database security
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
FOCS '95 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Secure multi-party computation made simple
SCN'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in communication networks
A three-layered model to implement data privacy policies
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Database encryption using enhanced affine block cipher algorithm
MMACTEE'08 Proceedings of the 10th WSEAS International Conference on Mathematical Methods and Computational Techniques in Electrical Engineering
Does enforcing anonymity mean decreasing data usefulness?
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Quality of protection
Secure Multi-party Computation Using Virtual Parties for Computation on Encrypted Data
ISA '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference and Workshops on Advances in Information Security and Assurance
Accurate and large-scale privacy-preserving data mining using the election paradigm
Data & Knowledge Engineering
Privacy-preserving deletion to generalization-based anonymous database
Proceedings of the CUBE International Information Technology Conference
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In traditional database security research, the database is usually assumed to be trustworthy. Under this assumption, the goal is to achieve security against external attacks (e.g. from hackers) and possibly also against users trying to obtain information beyond their privileges, for instance by some type of statistical inference. However, for many database applications such as health information systems there exist conflicting interests of the database owner and the users or organizations interacting with the database, and also between the users. Therefore the database cannot necessarily be assumed to be fully trusted.In this extended abstract we address the problem of defining and achieving security in a context where the database is not fully trusted, i.e., when the users must be protected against a potentially malicious database. Moreover, we address the problem of the secure aggregation of databases owned by mutually mistrusting organisations, for example by competing companies.