A Qualitative Analysis of the Intrusion-Tolerance Capabilities of the MAFTIA Architecture

  • Authors:
  • Robert Stroud;Ian Welch;John Warne;Peter Ryan

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK;Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand;University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK;University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

  • Venue:
  • DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

MAFTIA was a three-year European researchproject that explored the use of fault-tolerancetechniques to build intrusion-tolerant systems. TheMAFTIA architecture embodies a number of key designprinciples for building intrusion-tolerant systems,such as the notion of distributing trust throughout thesystem and limiting the extent to which individualcomponents are trusted, and the aim of this paper isto illustrate these principles and demonstrateMAFTIA's intrusion-tolerance capabilities by showinghow MAFTIA mechanisms and protocols might bedeployed in a realistic context. We discuss therelationship between intrusion tolerance and faulttolerance, and then describe how the MAFTIAarchitecture could be used to build an intrusion-tolerantversion of a hypothetical e-commerceapplication. Using fault trees, we analyse possibleattack scenarios and show how MAFTIA mechanismsprotect against them. We conclude the paper with adiscussion of related work and identify areas forfuture research.