Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
Cryptography and network security (2nd ed.): principles and practice
Cryptography and network security (2nd ed.): principles and practice
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Unlinkable serial transactions: protocols and applications
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Information security: protecting the global enterprise
Information security: protecting the global enterprise
A protocol for anonymous communication over the Internet
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Cryptography and E-Commerce
Accountable Anonymous Access to Services in Mobile Communication Systems
SRDS '99 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems
Achieving user privacy in mobile networks
ACSAC '97 Proceedings of the 13th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Specification of a framework for the anonymous use of privileges
Telematics and Informatics - Special issue: Developing a culture of privacy in the global village
Anonymous reputation based reservations in e-commerce (amnesic)
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
A privacy-preserving buyer-seller watermarking protocol with semi-trust third party
TrustBus'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business
An ECC based public key infrastructure usable for mobile applications
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Computational Science, Engineering and Information Technology
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This paper presents enhancements to an anonymous public-key certificate scheme originally intended for anonymous and fair document exchange. The appropriate use of these certificates may enable a party with access to a mobile phone and/or laptop computer to conduct multiple mobile e-commerce transactions anonymously yet accountably and thereby reduce the risk of developing a pseudonymous on-line profile. We propose modifications to the existing scheme to solve a recognised security flow. The proof of rightful ownership of the anonymous/real public-key certificate presented to obtain a (further) anonymous public-key certificate is presently achieved with a single piece of evidence, i.e. the private key associated with the presented certificate. Should an adversary compromise this key, then the adversary may obtain anonymous certificates in the rightful owner's name. Our proposal minimises the risk of an adversary obtaining anonymous certificates with a compromised private key.