Near rationality and competitive equilibria in networked systems

Authors:
Nicolas Christin;Jens Grossklags;John Chuang
Affiliations:
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA;University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA;University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
Venue:
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Year:
2004

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Abstract

A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system research only describe competitive equilibria in terms of pure Nash equilibria, that is, a situation where the strategy of each user is deterministic, and is her best response to the strategies of all the other users. However, the assumptions necessary for a pure Nash equilibrium to hold may be too stringent for practical systems. Using three case studies on network formation, computer security, and TCP congestion control, we outline the limits of game-theoretic models relying on Nash equilibria, and we argue that considering competitive equilibria of a more general form helps in assessing the accuracy of a game theoretic model, and can even help in reconciling predictions from game-theoretic models with empirically observed behavior.