Communications of the ACM
Proportional differentiated services: delay differentiation and packet scheduling
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Optimal oblivious routing in polynomial time
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing Elementary Symmetric Polynomials with a Subpolynomial Number of Multiplications
SIAM Journal on Computing
Competitive routing of virtual circuits in ATM networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Generalized secure routerless routing
ICN'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Networking - Volume Part II
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Suppose that there are n Senders and r Receivers. Our goal is to design a communication network such that long messages can be sent from Sender i to Receiver π(i) such that no other receiver can retrieve the message intended for Receiver π(i). The task can easily be completed using some classical interconnection network and routers in the network. Alternatively, if every Receiver is directly connected to all $n$ Senders, then the Senders can choose which channel to use for communication, without using any router. Fast optical networks are slowed down considerably if routers are inserted in their nodes. Moreover, handling queues or buffers at the routers is extremely hard in all-optical setting. An obvious routerless solution, connecting each possible Sender-Receiver pairs with direct channels seems to be infeasible in most cases. The main result of the present work is the mathematical model of two networks and corresponding network-protocols in which the Senders and the Receivers are connected with only ro(1) channels (in practice no more than 32 channels in both networks); there are no switching or routing-elements in the network, just linear combinations of the signals are computed. Such designs would be usable in fast all-optical networks. In the proof of the security of the networks we do not use any unproven cryptographical or complexity theoretical assumptions: the security is information-theoretically proved, and does not depend on cryptographical primitives.