An analysis of using reflectors for distributed denial-of-service attacks
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
FDNA '03 Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Future directions in network architecture
A DoS-limiting network architecture
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Towards an evolvable internet architecture
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
PlanetLab: overview, history, and future directions
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Using routing and tunneling to combat DoS attacks
SRUTI'05 Proceedings of the Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet on Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet Workshop
A data-oriented (and beyond) network architecture
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Dynamic names and private address maps: complete self-configuration for MANETs
CoNEXT '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM CoNEXT conference
Securing user-controlled routing infrastructures
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
TVA: a DoS-limiting network architecture
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
HTTP as the narrow waist of the future internet
Hotnets-IX Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
Protecting against DNS reflection attacks with Bloom filters
DIMVA'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Detection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security of information and networks
Verifying and enforcing network paths with icing
Proceedings of the Seventh COnference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies
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Defending against DoS attacks is extremely difficult; effective solutions probably require significant changes to the Internet architecture. We present a series of architectural changes aimed at preventing most flooding DoS attacks, and making the remaining attacks easier to defend against. The goal is to stimulate a debate on trade-offs between the flexibility needed for future Internet evolution and the need to be robust to attack.