Randomized algorithms
Information Hiding Techniques for Steganography and Digital Watermarking
Information Hiding Techniques for Steganography and Digital Watermarking
Multimedia content screening using a dual watermarking and fingerprinting system
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international conference on Multimedia
An Efficient Public Key Traitor Tracing Scheme
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Stretching the Limits of Steganography
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A note on the limits of collusion-resistant watermarks
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Improved spread spectrum: a new modulation technique for robust watermarking
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Spread-spectrum watermarking of audio signals
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Digital Rights Management in Ubiquitous Computing
IEEE MultiMedia
Modeling privacy compromise: visibility of individuals via DRM and RFID in ubiquitous computing
Proceedings of the 2008 Spring simulation multiconference
A robust biometric dual watermarking technique with hand vein patterns for digital images
International Journal of Biometrics
Fulltext-Image watermarking using improved DWT and HVS based on JPEG compression
AWIC'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Advances in Web Intelligence
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This article proposes a multimedia content protection system in which all copies of a protected object are identically watermarked, but each user has a distinct secret detection key that differs from the secret embedding key. An attacker with access to one detection key can fool the corresponding watermark detector but not other watermark detectors. Surprisingly, analogous to a criminal action, during this attack the attacker necessarily inserts his or her fingerprint into the modified content. Even a collusion clique of relatively large size cannot entirely remove the secret marks from the protected content by colluding their detection keys. More importantly, if the clique is not large enough, traces of the detection keys of all colluders can be detected with relatively high accuracy in the attacked clip. Our proposed watermark-fingerprint system achieves a minimum collusion size K that grows linearly with the size N of the marked object. In addition, we can augment our watermark-fingerprint system with a segmentation layer. The media content is partitioned into 5 segments, in which media players as well as forensic analyzers can reliably detect a watermark or fingerprint. Only detection keys that belong to the same segment can participate in the collusion clique. With segmentation, the minimum collusion size K grows as 0(N log N). Therefore, with or without segmentation, our watermark-fingerprint system significantly improves on the best-known asymptotic resistance to (fingerprint) collusion attacks of about O(N14/). Because we use a new protection protocol, comparing our system to classic fingerprint systems might seem unfair. However, such a comparison is important because the two technologies share a common goal: multimedia copyright enforcement. Our aim in this article is to characterize the collusion attacks against this system under the assumption that watermark detection is robust against signal-processing attacks on the protected object.