Honeypot Forensics Part I: Analyzing the Network

  • Authors:
  • Frederic Raynal;Yann Berthier;Philippe Biondi;Danielle Kaminsky

  • Affiliations:
  • MISC Magazine;Hervé Schauer Consultant;Arche/Omnetica Group;TEGAM International

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Security and Privacy
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

A major goal of honeypot research is to improve our knowledge of blackhats from two perspectives: technical and ethnological. For the former, we want new ways to discover rootkits, trojans, and potential zero-day exploits (although capturing zero-day exploits in a honeypot is an unusual event). For the latter, we want a better understanding of the areas of interest and hidden links between blackhat teams. One way to achieve these goals is to increase the verbosity of our honeypot logs and traces; the most common tools for doing this are Sebek (http://project.honeynet.org/tools/sebek/) for system events and Snort (www.snort.org) for network activity. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to correlate information from these sources, which complicates honeypot forensics.