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Multiagent systems
Dynamic Coalition Formation among Rational Agents
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Coalition formation with uncertain heterogeneous information
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A survey of multi-agent organizational paradigms
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Sequential decision making in repeated coalition formation under uncertainty
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Agent compatibility and coalition formation: investigating two interacting negotiation strategies
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ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
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WRAC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Radical Agent Concepts: innovative Concepts for Autonomic and Agent-Based Systems
Sequentially optimal repeated coalition formation under uncertainty
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Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
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Coalition formation problems arise when groups of agents need to work together to achieve tasks in an environment 驴 such as bidding for a contract or bulk buying goods. The work presented here shows how current theories for coalition formation can be combined with notions from iterative games to cover cases where populations of agents must solve coalition problems many times 驴 modelling a long series of coalition games rather than just a single one. The paper includes a problem formulation for iterative coalition games, experimental results for a simple coalition game world demonstrating how strong coalitions can emerge over time even from basic strategies and a discussion of the interactions between different strategies over time.