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This paper deals with modeling mental states of a rational agent, in particular states based on agentýs desires. It shows that the world the agent belongs to forces it to restrict its desires. More precisely, desires of a rational agent are restricted by the constraints that exist in the world and which express what is possible or necessary. Furthermore, if the agent is law-abiding, its desires are restricted by the regulations that are defined in the world and which express what is obligatory, permitted or forbidden. This paper characterizes how desires are restricted depending on the fact that the agent is law-abiding or not. This work considers the general case when the agent orders its own desires according to a preference order. The solution is based on modeling desires, regulations and constraints in an unique formal system which is a logic of conditional preferences.