Equilibrium Results for Dynamic Congestion Games
Transportation Science
The concert queueing game: to wait or to be late
Discrete Event Dynamic Systems
The concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
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Under relatively general assumptions a unique deterministic departure-time user equilibrium with a finite departure rate exists in the bottleneck model with drivers who differ in their unit costs of travel time, preferred times of arrival, and schedule delay cost functions. Existence requires that schedule delay cost functions be upper semicontinuous with respect to arrival time, and that schedule delay costs decline at a rate smaller than the unit cost of travel time. Uniqueness requires, more restrictively, that schedule delay cost functions be continuous.Several properties of equilibrium trip cost functions are derived forn groups of users withN iin groupi. The trip cost of a user in groupi is a nondecreasing function of eachN j , but typically rises more quickly with respect toN ithanN j ,j?i. Thus, users experience lower trip costs when they travel with users unlike themselves than with an equal number of users like themselves.