A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Secure Voting Using Partially Compatible Homomorphisms
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Some Remarks on a Receipt-Free and Universally Verifiable Mix-Type Voting Scheme
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Mix-Networks on Permutation Networks
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Mix and Match: Secure Function Evaluation via Ciphertexts
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Multi-authority secret-ballot elections with linear work
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Publicly verifiable secret sharing
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
On the security of condorcet electronic voting scheme
CIS'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Intelligence and Security - Volume Part II
Non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments for voting
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Extensive studies have been made on the electronic voting in the last twenty years, and many schemes have been proposed, in which both the security as well as the effectiveness have been improved. However, most available secure vote schemes mainly focused on the simple "one man, one vote" plurality protocol. In this paper, we address the security issues in Borda voting protocol, another important social decision protocol, in which a voter can rank the candidates by assigning them different points. In this paper, we propose a secure Borda voting scheme that guarantees full privacy protection of the voters as well as universal verifiability and weak robustness. Instead of assuming of existence of trusted or semi-trusted authorities as in other secure voting schemes, we employ the homomorphic ElGamal encryption in our scheme and distribute the private key among the all voters to achieve full privacy protection of voters. In such a way, all voters jointly compute the outcome of the election without revealing any further information of votersý individual preferences. An analysis of the protocol against the security requirements shows that the new protocol achieves full privacy protection, public verifiability, weak robustness, in addition to others addressed by other protocols reported in the literature.