How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-random bits
SIAM Journal on Computing
Private coins versus public coins in interactive proof systems
STOC '86 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A simple unpredictable pseudo random number generator
SIAM Journal on Computing
The complexity of perfect zero-knowledge
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Zero knowledge proofs of identity
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
An Improvement of the Fiat-Shamir Identification and Signature Scheme
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Everything Provable is Provable in Zero-Knowledge
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
Why and how to establish a private code on a public network
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proofs that yield nothing but their validity and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
New directions in cryptography
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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The relevance of zero knowledge to cryptography has become apparent in the recent years. In this paper we advance this theory by showing that interaction in any zero-knowledge proof can be replaced by sharing a common, short, random string. This advance finds immediate application in the construction of the first public-key cryptosystem secure against chosen ciphertext attack.Our solution, though not yet practical, is of theoretical significance, since the existence of cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attack has been a famous long-standing open problem in the field.