Reasoning about knowledge: an overview
Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
On epistemic logic and logical omniscience
Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
Conflict resolution of rules assigning values to virtual attributes
SIGMOD '89 Proceedings of the 1989 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
RI: A logic for reasoning with inconsistency
Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Symposium on Logic in computer science
All I know: a study in autoepistemic logic
Artificial Intelligence
Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal change
Artificial Intelligence
A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief
Artificial Intelligence
On the semantics of belief revision systems
TARK '92 Proceedings of the fourth conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
Revisions of Knowledge Systems Using Epistemic Entrenchment
Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge
A Nonstandard Approach to the Logical Omniscience Problem
Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge
How the semantic web will change KR: challenges and opportunities for a new research agenda
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Reasoning with inconsistency in structured text
The Knowledge Engineering Review
How to infer from inconsistent beliefs without revising
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
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Since everything is a consequence of an inconsistency, classical logics are not useful in modeling the reasoning of an agent who has inconsistent beliefs. In this paper, we differentiate consistent beliefs from inconsistent beliefs. We propose two belief operators Bc and B, standing for consistent belief and belief, respectively. Bc has the modus ponens property, by which the agent is able to reason with consistent beliefs as normal and draw consistent conclusions. B tolerates inconsistency, and by B the agent can reason about his inconsistent beliefs as well. The concept of consistent belief and our logical formalism for it are new, in that reasoning consistently about the information in an inconsistent knowledge base is possible. We also present a complete axiomatization for the logic and discuss the application of Bc and B in reasoning about implicit knowledge in a group of agents and eliminating inconsistency from a knowledge base.