An Experimental Assessment of Coleman's Linear System of Action for Supporting Policy Negotiations

  • Authors:
  • Johannes S. Timmermans;Giampiero E. G. Beroggi

  • Affiliations:
  • Wpoint Interactive, Spaarwaterstraat 108, 2593 RR Den Haag, Netherlands;MIS Department, School of Business Administration (HWZ), Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Lagerstrasse 5, 8021 Zurich, Switzerland

  • Venue:
  • Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

We report on an experimental assessment of the applicability of Coleman's Linear System of Action (LSA) to policy negotiations. In LSA, policy negotiations are modeled as exchange of control over issues. LSA allows one to compute the equilibrium control distribution for a group of decision makers, based on their distributions of preferences for, and control over, the issues at stake. The LSA theory, however, does not address the process of how the decision makers should exchange control over the issues to arrive at the equilibrium control. We test in an experimental setting partial and full LSA-based support vs. no support, for three different social structures among the decision makers engaging in repeated bilateral negotiation rounds. The results of the laboratory experiment indicate that the level of LSA support affects the negotiation process and the efficiency of reaching the equilibrium, while the influence of the decision makers' social structure is less clear. These results suggest that Coleman's LSA concept can be employed to support policy negotiations in a practical setting.