Belief change and dependence

Authors:
Luis Fariñas del Cerro;Andreas Herzig
Affiliations:
Université Paul Sabatier, France;Université Paul Sabatier, France
Venue:
TARK '96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Year:
1996

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Abstract

It is a very natural requirement for belief change operations that formulas that are independent of a given update should be preserved. Such a proposal has already been made by Gärdenfors (1990). In this perspective we study the links between belief change and the notion of dependence, our aim being to give dependence axioms able to characterize the AGM postulates. Proceeding exactly in the same way as Gärdenfors (1988) did in the case of epistemic entrenchment, we show how a given dependence relation can be used to define a contraction operation, and the other way round we show how an independence relation can be obtained from a given contraction operation. The grande finale is a characterization theorem.