Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Intercepting mobile communications: the insecurity of 802.11
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Flaws in Applying Proof Methodologies to Signature Schemes
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptoanalysis of the Cellular Encryption Algorithm
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Key-Insulated Public Key Cryptosystems
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of the Revised NTRU Signature Scheme
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Practice-Oriented Provable-Security
ISW '97 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Security
Security problems in 802.11-based networks
Communications of the ACM - Wireless networking security
On the (In)security of the Fiat-Shamir Paradigm
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
A signature scheme as secure as the Diffie-Hellman problem
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
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Many attempts to secure mobile wireless systems have failed abysmally. Notable examples include 802.11 WEP, as well as major cellular phone standards such as TDMA, CDMA, and GSM. The attacks typically result from the correct use of a bad cryptographic primitive or the incorrect use of a good one.By designing provably secure algorithms and protocols, we not only minimize the time required to gain confidence in the security of a system, but we virtually eliminate the possibility of a cryptographic vulnerability. Unfortunately, the concept of “provable securit” is often misunderstood. In this survey paper, we state precisely what provable security is and is not, and describe the benefits of the approach.