The automatic peer-to-peer signature for source address validation
KES'07/WIRN'07 Proceedings of the 11th international conference, KES 2007 and XVII Italian workshop on neural networks conference on Knowledge-based intelligent information and engineering systems: Part I
An IP traceback mechanism against mobile attacker for IPv6 and PMIPv6
WISA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information security applications
DMIPS: defensive mechanism against IP spoofing
ACISP'11 Proceedings of the 16th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Tracing the true source of an IPv6 datagram using policy based management system
APNOMS'06 Proceedings of the 9th Asia-Pacific international conference on Network Operations and Management: management of Convergence Networks and Services
A lightweight IP traceback mechanism on IPv6
EUC'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Directions in Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing
Detecting IP spoofing by modelling history of IP address entry points
AIMS'13 Proceedings of the 7th IFIP WG 6.6 international conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management, and Security: emerging management mechanisms for the future internet - Volume 7943
Survey Bloom filter applications in network security: A state-of-the-art survey
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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The Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE), developed at BBN, provides accurate tracing of single IP packets through a network. The SPIE system calculates several small hash values for each packet as it traverses a router, then stores these values in a data structure called a Bloom filter. Given a packet and an approximate time that packet was in the network, the SPIE system queries routers along the potential reverse path; a packet was "seen" at a router if the Bloom filter has stored the packetýs hash values. The SPIE system has been proven to work effectively and efficiently for IP version 4, largely because an IPv4 packet has sufficient entropy in the first 28 bytes to allow the hash functions to "uniquely" identify each packet. In this paper, we extend the traceback architecture to IP version 6, with the interesting result that the packet structure of IPv6 does not provide as much entropy in the field values as IPv4.