Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
Consistent, yet anonymous, Web access with LPWA
Communications of the ACM
Anonymous Web transactions with Crowds
Communications of the ACM
E-P3P privacy policies and privacy authorization
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Privacy-enhancing technologies: approaches and development
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Privacy-enhancing technologies for the Internet
COMPCON '97 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE International Computer Conference
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
VLDB '02 Proceedings of the 28th international conference on Very Large Data Bases
Platform for enterprise privacy practices: privacy-enabled management of customer data
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Encryption wars: shifting tactics
IEEE Spectrum
Feature: The Future of Computer and Network Forensics
Network Security
Distributed proxies for browsing privacy: a simulation of flocks
SAICSIT '05 Proceedings of the 2005 annual research conference of the South African institute of computer scientists and information technologists on IT research in developing countries
Towards a framework for connection anonymity
SAICSIT '05 Proceedings of the 2005 annual research conference of the South African institute of computer scientists and information technologists on IT research in developing countries
SQL's revoke with a view on privacy
Proceedings of the 2007 annual research conference of the South African institute of computer scientists and information technologists on IT research in developing countries
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This paper introduces a Privacy-Enhancing Technology (PET) based on a hybrid of Crowds and anonymising proxies. The PET--referred to as Flocks --operates by establishing a number of Web proxies and letting these proxies randomly forward requests to other proxies (or the final destination). This distributes users' requests over a number of such proxies, thereby helping to protect their (browsing) privacy. The problem that the paper considers is the effect of two primary design parameters on the privacy of the overall system. These parameters are the probability with which a proxy sends a request to the destination server rather than another proxy (α) and the number of proxies in the system (N). Two privacy objectives are identified, namely the number of hops used to satisfy a request and the portion of proxies that 'know' about a request. A third requirement deals with the external communication costs of the system. A formal analysis is performed to determine these three factors from the two identified parameters. Finally numerical examples are used to explore the impact of these two parameter choices in concrete terms. The proposed PET differs from existing PETs in two significant manners: It is primarily intended to be used inside an organisation to protect the privacy of users inside the organisation (in particular, employees) and it takes explicit cognisance of forensic factors.