How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Lightweight causal and atomic group multicast
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure agreement protocols: reliable and atomic group multicast in rampart
CCS '94 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security
Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Asynchronous consensus and broadcast protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Communications of the ACM
The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Load, Capacity, and Availability of Quorum Systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
The &OHgr; key management service
Journal of Computer Security
A high-throughput secure reliable multicast protocol
Journal of Computer Security
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Broadcast Protocols for Distributed Systems
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Total Ordering Algorithms for Asynchronous Byzantine Systems
WDAG '95 Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Distributed Algorithms
The Rampart Toolkit for Building High-Integrity Services
Selected Papers from the International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Distributed Systems
Randomized Byzantine Agreements
PODC '84 Proceedings of the third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Distributed Computing
Information and Computation
Distributing Trust on the Internet
DSN '01 Proceedings of the 2001 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (formerly: FTCS)
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A secure reliable multicast protocol enables a process to send a message to a group of recipients such that all correct destinations receive the same message, despite the malicious efforts of fewer than a third of the total number of processes, including the sender. This has been shown to be a useful tool in building secure distributed services, albeit with a cost that typically grows linearly with the size of the system. For very large networks, for which this is prohibitive, we present two approaches for reducing the cost: First, we show a protocol whose cost is on the order of the number of tolerated failures. Secondly, we show how relaxing the consistency requirement to a probabilistic guarantee can reduce the associated cost, effectively to a constant.