The advantage of complexity in two 2 × 2 games

  • Authors:
  • Jim Engle-Warnick

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, H3A 2T7, Canada

  • Venue:
  • Complexity - Special isssue: Computational modeling in the social sciences
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

Competing populations of finite automata co-evolve in an evolutionary algorithm to play two player games. Populations endowed with greater complexity do better against their less complex opponents in a strictly competitive constant sum game. In contrast, complexity determines efficiency levels, but not relative earnings, in a Prisoner's Dilemma game; greater levels of complexity result in mutually higher earnings. With reporting noise, advantages to complexity are lost and efficiency levels are reduced as relatively less complex strategies are selected.