An improvement of security enhancement for the timestamp-based password authentication scheme using smart cards

  • Authors:
  • Chou-Chen yang;Ren-Ching Wang

  • Affiliations:
  • Chaoyang University of Technology;Chaoyang University of Technology

  • Venue:
  • ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

Recently, Yang and Shieh proposed a timestamp-based and a nonce-based password authentication schemes. In 2002, Chan and Cheng pointed out that Yang and Shieh's timestamp-based password authentication scheme was vulnerable to the forgery attack. However, in 2003, Sun and Yeh pointed out that Chan and Cheng's attack was unreasonable. At the same time, Sun and Yeh pointed out that Yang and Shieh's password authentication schemes were still vulnerable to the forgery attack. Later Shen et al. proposed a modified scheme to resist Chan and Cheng's attack. In this paper, we shall point out that Shen et al.'s improvement is vulnerable to the forgery attack and find their scheme still cannot resist Sun and Yeh's attack. At the same time, we shall propose a solution to resist the above attacks.