ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Relations between secrets: two formal analyses of the Yahalom protocol
Journal of Computer Security
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
Secrecy types for asymmetric communication
Theoretical Computer Science - Foundations of software science and computation structures
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity by Typing for Security Protocols
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Semantic Model for Authentication Protocols
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Authenticity by tagging and typing
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
The ρ-spi Calculus at Work: Authentication Case Studies
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Dynamic types for authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Formal Methods in Security Engineering Workshop (FMSE 04)
Type-Based Automated Verification of Authenticity in Cryptographic Protocols
ESOP '09 Proceedings of the 18th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Type-based automated verification of authenticity in asymmetric cryptographic protocols
ATVA'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Automated technology for verification and analysis
Static analysis of authentication
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We present PEAR (Protocol Extendable AnalyzeR), a tool automating the two static analyses for authentication protocols presented in [7, 8]. These analyses are based on a tagging scheme that describes how message components contribute in achieving authentication. The tool provides a tag inference procedure that allows users to analyze untagged protocol specifications. When a protocol is successfully validated, tags give users precise information on how and why authentication is guaranteed. Notably, the tool receives in input both the protocol specification and the validation rules. Both validation and tag inference are parametric with respect to the validation rules, thus allowing users to easily implement new rules/analyses with no need of modifying the underlying procedures.