Asymmetric fingerprinting for larger collusions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure group communications using key graphs
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '98 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Combinatorial Properties and Constructions of Traceability Schemes and Frameproof Codes
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Collusion-Secure Fingerprinting for Digital Data (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Quick Group Key Distribution Scheme with "Entity Revocation"
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Trace and Revoke Schemes
FC '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Linear Code Implies Public-Key Traitor Tracing
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Efficient communication-storage tradeoffs for multicast encryption
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A public-key traitor tracing scheme with an optimal transmission rate
ICICS'09 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We proposed a new public-key traitor tracing scheme with revocation capability using dynamic shares and entity revocation techniques. Our scheme's traitor tracing and revocation programs cohere tightly. The size of the enabling block of our scheme is independent of the number of receivers. Each receiver holds one decryption key only. The distinct feature of our scheme is that when traitors are found, we can revoke their private keys (up to some threshold z) without updating the private keys of other receivers. In particular, no revocation messages are broadcast and all receivers do nothing. Previously proposed revocation schemes need update existing keys and entail large amount of broadcast messages. Our traitor tracing algorithm works in a black-box way. It is conceptually simple and fully k-resilient, that is, it can find all traitors if the number of them is k or less. The encryption algorithm of our scheme is semantically secure assuming that the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.