Delayed Internet routing convergence
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Detecting BGP configuration faults with static analysis
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
Understanding the network-level behavior of spammers
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Detecting BGP configuration faults with static analysis
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the internet
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Testing the reachability of (new) address space
Proceedings of the 2007 SIGCOMM workshop on Internet network management
SEM: A Security Evaluation Model for Inter-domain Routing System in the Internet
IPOM '08 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE international workshop on IP Operations and Management
Internet optometry: assessing the broken glasses in internet reachability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Re-wiring activity of malicious networks
PAM'12 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Passive and Active Measurement
Concurrent prefix hijacks: occurrence and impacts
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Internet measurement conference
A forensic case study on as hijacking: the attacker's perspective
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
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An important factor in the robustness of the interdomain routing system is whether the routers in autonomous systems (ASes) filter routes for "bogon" address space---i.e., private address space and address space that has not been allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). This paper presents an empirical study of bogon route announcements, as observed at eight vantage points on the Internet. On average, we observe several bogon routes leaked every few days; a small number of ASes also temporarily leak hundreds of bogon routes. About 40% of these bogon routes are not withdrawn for at least a day. We observed 110 different ASes originating routes for bogon prefixes and a few ASes that were responsible for advertising a disproportionate number of these routes. We also find that some ASes that do filter unallocated prefixes continue to filter them for as long as five months after they have been allocated, mistakenly filtering valid routes. Both of these types of delinquencies have serious implications: the failure to filter valid prefixes can could make nefarious activities such as denial of service attacks difficult to trace; failure to update filters when new prefixes are allocated prevents legitimate routes from being globally visible.