A security assessment of the minos architecture

  • Authors:
  • Jedidiah R. Crandall;Frederic T. Chong

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California at Davis;University of California at Davis

  • Venue:
  • ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News - Special issue: Workshop on architectural support for security and anti-virus (WASSA)
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Minos is a microarchitecture that implements Biba's low-water-mark integrity policy on individual words of data. Months of testing have revealed a robust system that stops attacks which corrupt control data to hijack program control flow. The low-water-mark policy is orthogonal to the memory model so that it works with existing software and middleware. The key is that Minos tracks the integrity of all data, but protects control flow by checking this integrity when a program uses the data for control transfer. Existing policies, in contrast, need to differentiate between control and non-control data a priori.Our implementation of Minos for Red Hat Linux 6.2 on a Pentium-based emulator is a usable Linux system on the network. We have demonstrated that Minos protects against a menagerie of real control data attacks, not just buffer overflows. This paper will detail our security assessments of Minos and other hardware and software mechanisms designed to stop the same class of attacks. We conclude that while Minos is substantially more secure than other approaches, existing C programs lack the semantic information necessary to totally secure their control flow. More details about the implementation of Minos are available in [1].