Branch history table prediction of moving target branches due to subroutine returns
ISCA '91 Proceedings of the 18th annual international symposium on Computer architecture
Improving prediction for procedure returns with return-address-stack repair mechanisms
MICRO 31 Proceedings of the 31st annual ACM/IEEE international symposium on Microarchitecture
Branch Prediction and Simultaneous Multithreading
PACT '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Conference on Parallel Architectures and Compilation Techniques
Repairing return address stack for buffer overflow protection
Proceedings of the 1st conference on Computing frontiers
Secure Bit: Transparent, Hardware Buffer-Overflow Protection
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Speculative return address stack management revisited
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO)
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Buffer overflow vulnerability is one of the most common security bugs existing in today's software systems. In this paper, we propose a microarchitectural design of a return address stack aiming to detect and stop stack smashing. This approach has been used in other proposals to guard against buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Our contribution is a design that handle multipath execution, speculative execution, abnormal control flow, and extended call depth. Our solution makes no assumption about the presence of architecturally visible calls and returns.