Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs
MobiHoc '00 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security
Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Game-theoretic approach for improving cooperation in wireless multihop networks
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics - Special issue on game theory
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To enable proper functioning of wireless ad hoc networks, all nodes in the network are expected to cooperate in forwarding each otherýs packet. But relaying other nodesý packets involves spending energy without getting any immediate revenue. Hence, due to the constraints on available energy the nodes usually have in such networks, from an individual nodeýs point of view, the best response is always not to cooperate. We model this problem as a repeated game and show analytically that given a suitable punishment mechanism, individual nodes can be deterred from their selfish behavior, and cooperation can emerge as the best response. We also show that generosity by other nodes cannot be part of a credible deterrent mechanism.