Revocation of privacy-enhanced public-key certificates

Authors:
N. Zhang;Q. Shi;M. Merabti
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK;School of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Sreet, Liverpool L3 3AF, UK;School of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Sreet, Liverpool L3 3AF, UK
Venue:
Journal of Systems and Software - Special issue: Software engineering education and training
Year:
2005

Citing 4
Cited 0

Fair exchange with a semi-trusted third party (extended abstract)

Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms

Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems

Communications of the ACM
Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

This paper presents a novel protocol for the revocation of privacy-enhanced/anonymous public-key certificates in relation to a protocol for anonymous public-key certificate issuing published previously. Not only can this certificate revocation protocol revoke an anonymous public-key certificate upon a request from its holder, but also automatically revoke any certificate issued directly or indirectly based on the certificate revoked, in an anonymous and accountable manner. In case the private key associated with an anonymous public-key certificate is suspected of having been compromised, the certificate holder can operate the protocol to easily revoke the compromised certificate together with its related ones so as to stop them being abused. The protocol is also assessed with regard to requirements such as accountability and anonymity.