Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Timestamps in key distribution protocols
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
A Discipline of Programming
Systematic Design of Two-Party Authentication Protocols
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Protocol Interactions and the Chosen Protocol Attack
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Generating Formal Cryptographic Protocol Specifications
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
A knapsack-based probabilistic encryption scheme
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Information Sciences: an International Journal
A pure labeled transition semantics for the applied pi calculus
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Optimization of TLS security protocol using the adaptable security model
Annales UMCS, Informatica
Optimization of TLS security protocol using the adaptable security model
Annales UMCS, Informatica
A new proxy signature scheme for a specified group of verifiers
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Analysing TLS in the strand spaces model
Journal of Computer Security
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Analyzing security protocols is notoriously difficult. In this paper, we show how a novel tool for analyzing classical cryptographic protocols can be used to model and analyze complex Internet security protocol families. CPAL-ES allows the representation of the interaction between two sub-protocols. Within a protocol such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) these are selected from a collection of sub-protocols utilized by a principal. Modeling subversion related to sub-protocol interactions is an important part of formally understanding attacks upon protocol suites. The CPAL environment contains sufficient functionality to verify the feasibility of these attacks.We also define and classify the characteristics that add complexity to modern security protocol and some impacts this complexity has on security protocol analysis. Finally, we discuss the modifications that were necessary in our formal method tool to answer this complexity and show how the tool illuminates flaws in the TLS protocol.