ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Intensional specifications of security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Simple Logic for Authentication Protocol Design
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Security Protocol Design via Authentication Tests
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Searching for a Solution: Engineering Tradeoffs and the Evolution of Provably Secure Protocols
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The dawning of the autonomic computing era
IBM Systems Journal
Fast automatic synthesis of security protocols using backward search
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
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This paper considers a new security protocol paradigm whereby principals negotiate and on-the-fly generate security protocols according to their needs. When principals wish to interact then, rather than offering each other a fixed menu of 'known' protocols, they negotiate and, possibly with the collaboration of other principles, synthesise a new protocol that is tailored specifically to their current security environment and requirements. This approach provides a basis for autonomic security protocols. Such protocols are self-configuring since only principal assumptions and protocol goals need to be a-priori configured. The approach has the potential to survive security compromises that can be modelled as changes in the beliefs of the principals. A compromise of a key or a change in the trust relationships between principals can result in a principal self-healing and synthesising a new protocol to survive the event.