Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

Authors:
Makoto Yokoo;Yuko Sakurai;Shigeo Matsubara
Affiliations:
NTT Communication Science Laboratories, 2-4 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto 619-0237, Japan;NTT Communication Science Laboratories, 2-4 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto 619-0237, Japan;NTT Communication Science Laboratories, 2-4 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto 619-0237, Japan
Venue:
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: Decision theory and game theory in agent design
Year:
2005

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Abstract

In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). In Internet auctions, false-name bids are very difficult to detect since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible. The characteristics of the TPD protocol are that the number of trades and prices of exchange are controlled by the threshold price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.