The complexity and approximability of finding maximum feasible subsystems of linear relations
Theoretical Computer Science
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Secure verification of location claims
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
The sybil attack in sensor networks: analysis & defenses
Proceedings of the 3rd international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Triangulation and Embedding Using Small Sets of Beacons
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Visualization assisted detection of sybil attacks in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Visualization for computer security
On spreading recommendations via social gossip
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Distributed algorithms for stable and secure network coordinates
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
A Distributed and Oblivious Heap
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
A survey of attack and defense techniques for reputation systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Interactive detection of network anomalies via coordinated multiple views
Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium on Visualization for Cyber Security
Secure latency estimation with treeple
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A survey of DHT security techniques
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
SybilLimit: a near-optimal social network defense against sybil attacks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Sybil defenses via social networks: a tutorial and survey
ACM SIGACT News
The Frog-Boiling Attack: Limitations of Secure Network Coordinate Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Hop chains: secure routing and the establishment of distinct identities
OPODIS'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
Public key cryptography sans certificates in ad hoc networks
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Reliable client accounting for P2P-infrastructure hybrids
NSDI'12 Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Sybil attack detection through global topology pattern visualization
Information Visualization
GAUR: a method to detect Sybil groups in peer-to-peer overlays
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing
Sybil resilient identity distribution in P2P networks
Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communications and Informatics
KoNKS: konsensus-style network koordinate system
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
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We study ways to restrict or prevent the damage that can be caused in a peer-to-peer network by corrupt entities creating multiple pseudonyms. We show that it is possible to remotely issue certificates that can be used to test the distinctness of identities. To our knowledge, this is the first work that shows that remote anonymous certification of identity is possible under adversarial conditions. Our certification protocols are based on geometric techniques that establish location information in a fault-tolerant and distributed fashion. They do not rely on a centralized certifying authority or infrastructure that has direct knowledge of entities in the system, and work in Euclidean or spherical geometry of arbitrary dimension. Our protocols tolerate corrupt entities, including corrupt certifiers as well as collusion by certification applicants and certifiers. We consider both broadcast and point-to-point message passing models.