Stabilization of tag-mediated interaction by sexual reproduction in an evolutionary agent system

  • Authors:
  • F. Alkemade;D. D. B. van Bragt;J. A. La Poutré

  • Affiliations:
  • CWI, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science, P.O. Box 94079, 1090 GB Amsterdam, The Netherlands;CWI, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science, P.O. Box 94079, 1090 GB Amsterdam, The Netherlands;CWI, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science, P.O. Box 94079, 1090 GB Amsterdam, The Netherlands

  • Venue:
  • Information Sciences: an International Journal - Special issue: Computational intelligence in economics and finance
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

The evolution of cooperation in a system of agents playing the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is investigated. We present results for the standard 2-person IPD as well as the more general N-person IPD (NIPD) game. In our computational model, agents have visible tags and choose whether to interact or not based upon these. We consider the evolutionary stability of the evolving populations. We extend previous work by introducing sexual reproduction (recombination) of agents and by analyzing its influence on the evolving populations. We observed the occasional formation of very stable cooperative societies, as opposed to previous results without sexual reproduction. These cooperative societies are able to resist invasions of "mimics" (defecting agents with the tag of a cooperating agent).