The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Reasoning about knowledge
Tractable multiagent planning for epistemic goals
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 3
The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions
TARK '98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Alternating-time Temporal Logic
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Privacy, economics, and price discrimination on the Internet
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
Reasoning about Uncertainty
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Logic and game theory for social mechanisms
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Argumentation in artificial intelligence
Artificial Intelligence
Suspicion of Hidden Agenda in Persuasive Argument
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2006
Quantifying privacy in multiagent planning
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Planning in multiagent systems
Self-disclosure decision making based on intimacy and privacy
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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Agents often want to protect private information, while at the same acting upon the information. These two desires are in conflict, and this conflict can be modeled in strategic games where the utility not only depends on the expected value of the possible outcomes, but also on the information properties of the strategy an agent uses. In this paper we define two such games using the information theory concepts of entropy and relative entropy. For both games we compute optimal response strategies and establish the existence of Nash equilibria.