Towards a formal model for task allocation via coalition formation

Authors:
Leila Amgoud
Affiliations:
IRIT - CNRS, route de Narbonne, Toulouse, France
Venue:
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Year:
2005

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the problem of generating coalition structures for task allocation via coalition formation. It provides a unified formal framework for constructing those coalitions structures. The framework takes as input a set of coalitions whose structures are abstract, a conflict relation between the coalitions, and a preference relation between the coalitions and returns the coalitions structures. Three semantics for coalitions structures will be proposed: a basic semantics which will return a unique coalition structure, stable semantics and preferred semantics. These two last may return several coalitions structures at the same time.