Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction: handling arbitrary utility of the buyer

Authors:
Takayuki Suyama;Makoto Yokoo
Affiliations:
NTT Corporation, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto, Japan;Kyushu University, Hakozaki, Higashi-ku, Fukuoka, Japan
Venue:
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Year:
2005

Citing 2
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Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.

Artificial Intelligence
Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction

AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1

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Abstract

This paper develops new protocols for a combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement auction in which each sales item (task) is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. Furthermore, multiple tasks exist, and both buyer and sellers can have arbitrary (e.g., complementary/substitutable) preferences on a bundle of tasks.