Risky trust: risk-based analysis of software systems

  • Authors:
  • Zaid Dwaikat;Francesco Parisi-Presicce

  • Affiliations:
  • George Mason University, Fairfax, VA;Univ. di Roma La Sapienza, Rome (IT)

  • Venue:
  • SESS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Software engineering for secure systems—building trustworthy applications
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Measuring the security of a software system is a difficult problem. This paper presents a model using common security concepts to evaluate the security of a system under design. After providing definitions for all relevant concepts and formalizing some of them, we define security requirements for transactions and provide mechanisms to measure the likelihood of violation of these requirements. Our model is based on individual risks presented by system components. Based on the security policy and individual risks, we calculate violation risk for a certain transaction. Context and other risk factors are considered and can be used to adjust the final risk figure. As part of our discussion, we address trust and risk and their significance to security engineering. Based on the decision process, the same trust assumptions may increase, or decrease, the risk to the system. We model the fact that small individual risks can be transformed into major risks when combined together in a complex attack.