Inductive inference as ampliative and non monotonic reasoning

  • Authors:
  • Isaac Levi

  • Affiliations:
  • Columbia University

  • Venue:
  • TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Inductive Inference is reasoning that justifies change from one state of full belief or absolute certainty to another by adding new information to the initial state that is consistent with it but does not entail it. Inductive inference is, therefore, ampliative. It is also non monotonic. But the deviations from monotonicity differ from those characterized by belief revision according to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson or preferential entailment developed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor and Lehmann and Magidor. The default reasoning of Reiter resembles ampliative reasoning more closely according to the decision theoretic account of inductive expansion proposed in this essay. The paper seeks to explain the differences and why they occur.