A simple power analysis attack against the key schedule of the Camellia block cipher

Authors:
Lu Xiao;Howard M. Heys
Affiliations:
QUALCOMM Incorporated, San Diego, CA;Electrical and Computer Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Canada
Venue:
Information Processing Letters
Year:
2005

Citing 1
Cited 1

Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks

IEEE Transactions on Computers

Attacks of simple block ciphers via efficient heuristics

Information Sciences: an International Journal

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.89

Visualization

Abstract

This paper presents a simple power analysis attack against the key schedule of Camellia. The attack works for the smart card environment which leaks the Hamming weight of data being processed, making use of the Hamming weight to deduce all key bits. It is shown that determining the cipher key given accurate power analysis data is very fast and does not require any pair of plaintext and ciphertext.