Fujisaki–Okamoto hybrid encryption revisited

  • Authors:
  • David Galindo;Sebastià Martín;Paz Morillo;Jorge L. Villar

  • Affiliations:
  • Dep. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord, c/Jordi Girona, 1-3, 08034, Barcelona, Spain;Dep. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord, c/Jordi Girona, 1-3, 08034, Barcelona, Spain;Dep. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord, c/Jordi Girona, 1-3, 08034, Barcelona, Spain;Dep. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord, c/Jordi Girona, 1-3, 08034, Barcelona, Spain

  • Venue:
  • International Journal of Information Security - Special issue on SC 2003
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

At Crypto’99, Fujisaki and Okamoto [11] presented a generic transformation from weak secure asymmetric and symmetric schemes into an IND-CCA hybrid encryption scheme in the Random Oracle Model, which has been extensively used in several cryptographic scenarios. The work we present here forms part of the careful revision of the provable security techniques initiated by Shoup in [25] insofar as we find some ambiguities in the proof of this generic conversion, which can lead to false claims. Consequently, the original conversion is modified and the class of asymmetric primitives that can be used is shortened. Furthermore, the concept of easily verifiable primitive is formalized, showing its connection with the gap problems introduced in [18]. Using these ideas, a completely new security proof for the modified transformation is given, which is phrased using currently widely accepted techniques. The reduction thereby obtained turns out to be tight, enhancing the concrete security claimed in the original work for the easily verifiable primitives. For the remaining primitives, the concrete security is improved at the cost of stronger assumptions. Finally, the resistance of the new conversion against reject timing attacks is addressed.