Key Substitution Attacks on Provably Secure Short Signature Schemes

Authors:
Chik-How Tan
Affiliations:
The author is with the School of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798. E-mail: echikhow@ntu.edu.sg
Venue:
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Year:
2005

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Abstract

Recently, Boneh et al. proposed provably secure short signature schemes in the standard model and in the random oracle model respectively. In this letter, we propose strong-key substitution attacks on these signature schemes. In one of the attacks, we show that an adversary can generate a new public key satisfying all legitimate signatures created by the legitimate signer.