Security analysis of efficient (Un-) fair non-repudiation protocols

Authors:
S. Gürgens;C. Rudolph
Affiliations:
Fraunhofer – Institute for Secure Telecooperation SIT, Rheinstrasse 75, D-64295, Darmstadt, Germany;Fraunhofer – Institute for Secure Telecooperation SIT, Rheinstrasse 75, D-64295, Darmstadt, Germany
Venue:
Formal Aspects of Computing
Year:
2005

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Abstract

An approach to protocol analysis using asynchronous product automata (APA) and the simple homomorphism verification tool (SHVT) is demonstrated on several variants of the well known Zhou–Gollmann fair non-repudiation protocol and on two more recent optimistic fair non-repudiation protocols. Attacks on all these protocols are presented and an improved version of the Zhou–Gollmann protocol is proposed.