Resilience for the Scalability of Dependability

  • Authors:
  • Jean-Claude Laprie

  • Affiliations:
  • LAAS-CNRS, 7, Avenue Colonel Roche 31077 Toulouse, France

  • Venue:
  • NCA '05 Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

The current state-of-knowledge and state-of-the-art [1] reasonably enable the construction and operation of critical systems, be they safety-critical (e.g., avionics, railway signaling, nuclear control) or availability-critical (e.g., back-end servers for transaction processing). The situation drastically worsens when considering large, networked, evolving, systems either fixed or mobile, with demanding requirements driven by their domain of application. There is statistical evidence that these emerging systems suffer from a significant drop in dependability and security in comparison with the former systems [2]. The cost of failures in service is growing rapidly, as a consequence of the degree of dependence placed on computing systems, up to several million euros per hour of downtime for some businesses [3]. There is thus a dependability gap opening in front of us that, if not filled, will endanger the very basis and advent of Ambient Intelligence. Filling the gap clearly needs dependability and security technologies to scale up, in order to counteract the two main drivers of the creation and widening of the gap: complexity and cost pressure. Coping with complexity and cost certainly demands significant progress in the rigorous design of the functionalities provided by the information infrastructures. However, the interplay between: a) rigorous design on one hand, and b) complexity and cost on the other, will inevitably lead to residual development defects, vulnerabilities, and room for interaction mistakes. This has been true throughout the history of computing, and will be all the more true in the future. There is thus a need to focus on complementary approaches aimed at tolerating the various classes of threats that can lead to system failures. The desired outcome is to provide pervasive information infrastructures with scalable resilience for survivability in direct support of the emerging pervasiveness of computing systems. Complexity growth under cost pressure results from (drastic) changes that can be functional, environmental and technological. Examples of such changes are: a) growth of systems as demand increases, b) merging of systems in company acquisitions or coupling of systems