Specifying electronic voting protocols in typed MSR

Authors:
Theodoros Balopoulos;Stefanos Gritzalis;Sokratis K. Katsikas
Affiliations:
University of the Aegean, Samos, Greece;University of the Aegean, Samos, Greece;University of the Aegean, Samos, Greece
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Year:
2005

Citing 6
Cited 0

Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete

Communications of the ACM
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms

Communications of the ACM
Subtyping Dependent Types

LICS '96 Proceedings of the 11th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Specifying Privacy-Preserving Protocols in Typed MSR

Computer Standards & Interfaces
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes

EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient proofs that a committed number lies in an interval

EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Electronic voting, as well as other privacy-preserving protocols, use special cryptographic primitives and techniques that are not widely used in other types of protocols, e.g. in authentication protocols. These include blind signatures, commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, mixes and homomorphic encryption. Furthermore, typical formalizations of the Dolev-Yao intruder's capabilities do not take into account these primitives and techniques, nor do they consider some types of attacks that e-voting as well as other types of protocols are designed to protect against, such as privacy attacks due to undesired linkability of protocol executions. This work aims to extend Typed MSR so that it is able to support the specification of privacy-preserving protocols, as well as the capabilities of a Dolev-Yao intruder designed to attack such protocols.