The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Privacy, economics, and price discrimination on the Internet
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
Privacy in electronic commerce and the economics of immediate gratification
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Conditioning Prices on Purchase History
Marketing Science
Electronic auctions with private bids
WOEC'98 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3
Randomization as a strategy for sellers during price discrimination, and impact on bidders' privacy
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Auctions and differential pricing: optimal seller and bidder strategies in second-chance offers
Computational Economics
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This paper examines a generalization of a two-stage game common on eBay: an ascending-price auction followed by price discrimination (the second chance offer). High bids in the auction lead to high price offers during price discrimination, and a financial disadvantage in the second stage. The disadvantage depends on (a) the amount of information revealed to the seller in the first stage, and hence the extent of privacy protection provided and (b) whether the bidder is non-strategic (ignores the possibility of price discrimination) or rational. A privacy cost of one mechanism over another is defined and studied.For the non-strategic bidder, the second chance offer provides a zero payoff. Addition of privacy protection (anonymity and bid secrecy) decreases revenue and increases expected payoff, with higher bidders benefiting more. Privacy protection can, however, decrease an individual bidder's payoff by shielding potential buyers from the seller and thus causing an opportunity loss.If the bidder is rational, price discrimination results in a lower revenue than consecutive auctions, and is a bad strategy for the seller. Additionally, rational behavior provides more advantage to the bidder than does anonymity protection.