Inside Microsoft Windows 2000
Programming the Microsoft Windows Driver Model, Second Edition
Programming the Microsoft Windows Driver Model, Second Edition
Optimization of range checking
SIGPLAN '82 Proceedings of the 1982 SIGPLAN symposium on Compiler construction
RAD: A Compile-Time Solution to Buffer Overflow Attacks
ICDCS '01 Proceedings of the The 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Practical, transparent operating system support for superpages
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
Efficient and effective array bound checking
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Tracefs: A File System to Trace Them All
FAST '04 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies
StackGuard: automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
FiST: a language for stackable file systems
ATEC '00 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Parallel architectures and compilation techniques
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Improper access of data buffers is one of the most common errors in programs written in assembler, C, C++, and several other languages. Existing programs and OSs frequently access the data beyond the allocated buffers or access buffers that were already freed. Such programs and OSs may run for years before their problems can be detected because improper memory accesses frequently result in a silent data corruption. Not surprisingly, most computer worms exploit buffer overflow errors to gain complete control over computer systems. Only after recent worm epidemics, did code developers begin to realize the scale of the problem and the number of potential memory-access violations in existing code.Due to the syntax and flexibility of many programming languages, memory access violation problems cannot be detected at compile time. Tools that verify correctness before every memory access impose unacceptably high overheads. As a result, most of the developed techniques focus on preventing the hijacking of control by hackers and worms due to stack overflows. Consequently, hidden data corruption is given less attention.Memory access violations can be efficiently detected using the hardware support of the paging and virtual memory.Kefence is the general run-time solution we developed that allows to detect and avoid in-kernel overflow, underflow, and stale access problems for internal kernel buffers. Kefence is especially applicable to file system code because file systems operate at a high level of abstraction and require no direct access to the physical memory. At the same time, file systems use a large number of kernel buffers and file system errors are most harmful for users because users' persistent data can be corrupted.